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Abstract: We investigate the impact of institutions on entrepreneurial entry, based on a 
large cross-country sample, combining working age population data generated by the 
GEM project with macro level indicators. Our four key findings indicate that: (a) 
institutional obstacles to entrepreneurship have different impact in rich countries 
compared to poor countries; (b) institutional obstacles have a stronger impact on 
‘opportunity entrepreneurship’ than on ‘necessity entrepreneurship’; (c) two 
institutional indicators - property right protection and access to finance - appear to have 
a dominant impact on entrepreneurship; (d) institutions have a long term impact. More 
than ten years after the Soviet system imploded in Central and Eastern Europe, these 
countries still experience significantly lower levels of entrepreneurship than economies 
coming from different legal traditions. 
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1 Introduction 
Existing studies indicate that the entry of new firms can result in 
employment creation and more equitable income distributions. New firm 
entry provides a churning effect to the economy, fosters development, 
innovation and economic change (Hirschman, 1958; Baumol, 1990; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Mickiewicz et al., 2005; Berkovitz and 
Jackson, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006). However, where institutions are weak 
entrepreneurs either do not undertake new projects or restrict their 
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activities to unproductive ones, with a resulting loss of efficiency (Glaeser 
et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1997; Baumol, 1990). Unfortunately, institutions 
are difficult to measure and unbundle. As a result, the challenge of 
exploring the link between institutions and entrepreneurship has rarely 
been analysed successfully in the empirical literature. In this paper, we 
attempt to address this knowledge gap. 
One of the major reasons limiting the existing empirical literature is the 
shortage of appropriate comparative data. Most studies on 
entrepreneurship focus on small enterprises, taking them as a proxy for 
entrepreneurial activity. Yet, to study the issue of entry one has to have 
data on the whole universe of potential entrepreneurs, not just of the 
existing business owners. We base our understanding of entrepreneurship 
on the work of Lumpkin and Dess who state that ‘the essential act of 
entrepreneurship is new entry’ (1996, p. 136). Moreover, we differentiate 
between different types of entrepreneurship in terms of the entrepreneur’s 
motivation being driven by entrepreneurial opportunity or necessity.  
Data collected through the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
surveys, an international project co-ordinated jointly by Babson College, 
USA and London Business School, UK, offers a unique opportunity to 
analyse entrepreneurs within the context of the working age population. 
Another important advantage of using the GEM dataset is that one can 
safely introduce the institutional country-level variables (proxies) as 
explanatory factors, without being concerned with simultaneity bias (as 
the individual decision of a potential entrepreneur does not affect country-
level institutions). As argued by Schaffer et al. (2006), business barriers (in 
our case: obstacles to entry) can be best tested using cross-country 
variation and this is made possible through the GEM dataset. We use the 
rich data available in the GEM 2001-2005 surveys to analyse the 
institutional barriers to entrepreneurship. Much analysis have already 
been undertaken using GEM data at a country level and some limited 
studies have compared countries’ aggregate indicators, but we are not 
aware of any study which has investigated the impact of institutions on 
entrepreneurship, combining macro and micro level data. 
This study is also novel in its institutional approach. We apply an 
institutional framework in order to analyse the effects of the institutional 
environment on entrepreneurship development in 31 different countries 
taking special care of multicollinearity between the institutional 
indicators. While researchers such as Desai et al. (2003) and Klapper et al. 
(2006) have used other datasets and Wennekers et al. (2005) have used 
country level means from the GEM dataset to analyse similar issues, we 
would argue that our work presents a more comprehensive study both in 
terms of scope, scale and methodology and therefore offers more robust 
results. 
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Our four key findings indicate that: (a) institutional obstacles to 
entrepreneurship have different impact in rich countries compared to poor 
countries; (b) institutional obstacles have a stronger impact on 
‘opportunity entrepreneurship’ than on ‘necessity entrepreneurship’; (c) 
two institutional indicators - property right protection and access to 
finance - appear to have a dominant impact on entrepreneurship; (d) 
institutions have a long term impact. More than ten years after the Soviet 
system imploded in Central and Eastern Europe, these countries still 
experience significantly lower levels of entrepreneurship than economies 
coming from different legal traditions. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our institutional 
framework and develops the four hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 
provides a description of the data used, the variables chosen for our 
analysis as well as an overview of the estimation techniques employed. 
Section 4 presents our results and the paper concludes in section 5. 
2 Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses are derived from applying an institutional framework 
to the issue of entrepreneurship development in a cross-cultural context. 
We focus on the effect of institutions on entrepreneurship entry. We 
expect that when considering entry, potential entrepreneurs will take into 
account both direct barriers encountered at time of entry and continuous 
constraints in the business environment. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is:  
H1: The level of entrepreneurial entry will be higher as both the business 
environment (institutions) improves and the entry costs are lower. 
In line with the four studies discussed above, in a study based on 
entrepreneurship based on transition countries in Eastern Europe, Johnson 
et al. (2002) find that the insecurity of property rights may be a key factor 
deterring entry in the small firm sector. North has argued that insecure 
property rights result in using technologies that employ little fixed capital 
and that firms will typically be small (North 1990, p. 65). Grilo and 
Irigoyen (2006) report a negative effect of the perception of lack of finance 
on the probability of being self-employed using European data for 2000, 
though Grilo and Thurik (2005) are unable to identify an effect for 2004. 
Studies mentioned above indicate the protection of property rights and 
finance may present two crucial institutional characteristics affecting the 
entrepreneurship entry. We formulate our second hypothesis to read: 
H2: Property rights and finance are the two institutional characteristics that 
have most significant effect on the level of entrepreneurial activity. 
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In line with the existing literature (such as Wennekers et al., 2005), we 
expect institutional legacies to persist. As a result, legal origin should 
matter. In particular, we expect that countries emerging from the Soviet 
system may still suffer from the ‘entrepreneurial deficit’: 
H3: Institutional legacies will affect entrepreneurial activity resulting in 
countries emerging from the Soviet system to suffer lower levels of 
entrepreneurial activity.  
There is general agreement in the field of entrepreneurship that the 
whole notion of entrepreneurship hinges on the concept of opportunity 
recognition (McMullen and Sheperd, 2006).  Entrepreneurial behaviour as 
such is not seen as a stable characteristic that differentiates some people 
from others, but as the tendency of some individuals to respond to the 
situation cues of opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, p. 219). 
Logically, subsequent to the discovery of an opportunity, a potential 
entrepreneur must decide to exploit the opportunity (ibid). Individuals 
process the cues from the environment around them and set about 
constructing the perceived opportunity into a viable business proposition 
(Krueger et al., 2000). As Sarasvathy (2004, p. 209) notes, most individuals 
will become entrepreneurs due to suitable conditions; a combination of 
opportunity and a conducive environment. We therefore would expect 
individuals who are reacting to entrepreneurial opportunities in the 
environment to be more sensitive to the overall institutional environment 
(which in turn affects the attractiveness of opportunity exploitation) than 
individuals who become entrepreneurs purely out of necessity. Therefore 
hypothesis 4 has been formulated to read: 
H4: The significance of institutions on the level of entrepreneurial activity will 
be greater for opportunity than necessity entrepreneurship. 
3 Data and Methodology 
This section provides further detail regarding the data used (collected 
by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) as well as a presentation of the 
independent and dependent variables used for our analysis. In addition, it 
describes the estimation techniques used to test our hypotheses. 
3.1 GEM Data 
The dataset we utilise was generated by the GEM project. Data are 
generated by surveys, which rely on stratified samples of at least 2,000 
individuals per country. The dataset includes a number of individual 
social and economic characteristics and perceptions. The key advantage of 
the GEM methodology relates to the fact that the sample is drawn from 
the whole working age population in each country and therefore captures 
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both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. While data on business 
ownership and individual business financing is included, entrepreneurial 
activity is primarily viewed as new, nascent start-up activity. Nascent 
entrepreneurs are those individuals between the ages of 18 – 64 years who 
have taken some action toward creating a new business in the past year. 
To qualify for this category, these individuals must also expect to own a 
share of the business they are starting and the business must not have 
paid any wages or salaries for more than three months (Minniti et al., 
2005b). Established entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who own or 
manage a company and have paid wages or salaries for more than 42 
months (ibid). 
We utilise all available data from the 2001-2005 surveys. Our survey 
database includes the following individual country samples (all have at 
least 2,000 observations): Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Georgia, India, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States (all 2001), Slovenia (2001-2005), 
Hungary (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005), Poland (2001 and 2002), Spain (2001 and 
2004), Australia (2001 and 2005), Russia (2002), Latvia (2005). 
In our measures for the institutional environment, for methodological 
reasons already discussed we depart from the practice of running separate 
models for each institutional dimension entered alone. Instead we follow 
two alternative methods. Firstly, we use a single aggregate institutional 
indicator (corruption measure from Transparency International and 
economic freedom measure from Heritage). Secondly, we focus on a 
smaller number of indicators using the results of the exploratory factor 
analysis based on the Heritage Foundation’s ten institutional indicators 
discussed above. We discuss the two methods in turn. 
3.2 Single, Aggregate Institutional Indicators: Economic 
Freedom, Corruption 
It is not only the direct barriers to start the business but also the barriers 
to develop it which count for start-up decisions. Where the potential 
entrepreneurs perceive that they would not be able to expand their 
businesses to realise all potential gains, they may decide against starting 
it.1 Thus, general business environment may count for entrepreneurial 
decisions. In this respect, the Heritage Foundation’s aggregate index of 
economic freedom matches the type of measurements useful for the 
                                                 
1 This is also the reason why the results on factors affecting incorporation (as discussed 
above) count. The forward-looking entrepreneur is likely to take opportunities for further 
business development in his/her decision to entry. 
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analysis of our hypotheses.2 In our analysis, we use the Heritage 
Foundation’s aggregate Index of Economic Freedom (based on ten 
institutional indicators) as our first measure to illustrate the possible 
effects of barriers in the institutional environment on new firm entry.  
Our second aggregate measure of the institutional environment is the 
Corruption Perception Index, published by Transparency International. 
Corruption may be seen as a general proxy for the quality of the 
institutional environment. Tanzi (1998) argues that corruption reflects the 
multidimentional impact of poor institutions and Djankov et al. (2002) 
provides empirical evidence showing that corruption reflects an inefficient 
overregulated environment. Incidence of corruption may prevent business 
to grow above some threshold level, as in the latter case, the business 
owners may be expropriated by corrupt officials, especially the tax 
authority (Barkhatova, 2000; Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2006). Moreover, 
expectations of this kind may in turn discourage potential entrepreneurs 
from starting a business. 
Transparency International index relies on a methodology which 
combines information from ten different surveys of corruption, where a 
score for any country is included only when there is an overlapping 
assessment of a country at least by three independent surveys. The 
respondents come from three different groups: residents of the developed 
countries familiar with a given economy, non-residents from 
neighbouring countries, and own-residents. The correlation in assessment 
between these three groups is high. The scores from different surveys are 
combined by first matching percentiles between surveys, correcting 
resulting distributions with Beta transformation and finally estimating 
distributions of scores for each country using bootstrapping (see 
Lambsdorff, 2005, for details). 
3.3 Multiple Institutional Indicators. Unbundling the 
Economic Freedom: Results 
We now turn to the results of our exploratory factor analysis. While the 
details of the analysis are presented in the next section, we first present the 
summary of our results, namely  the four dimensions we obtained via 
compressing the ten indicators of the Heritage Foundation. Data reduction 
is needed to eliminate the impact of multicollinearity so that we can focus 
on the reduced number of variables characterised by an acceptable level of 
cross-correlation. However, where possible we will apply the underlying 
                                                 
2 The Heritage Foundation defines economic freedom as ‘the absence of government 
coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and 
services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself’ 
(Beach and Miles, 2006, p. 56). 
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economic indicators that correspond to the highest loadings on each factor 
instead of extracted factors.  
In addition, we introduce a variable representing the size of the 
financial sector, and following Klapper et al. (2006) we use the ratio of 
credit to private sector to GDP as our proxy for the supply of finance in 
the economy. 
3.4 Unbundling the Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom or 
Institutional Quality? 
We now turn to the details of our data reduction exercise. A closer look 
at the Heritage Foundation indicators reveals possible discrepancy 
between what they aim to measure and what in reality is captured by the 
measurement instruments. While the indicators measure heterogeneity in 
institutions one should not assume that they can all be ordered along the 
same underlying axis. As confirmed by our principal components analysis 
(see below), the individual indicators cluster around more than one factor. 
Therefore, while we will apply the aggregate composite measure of 
economic freedom as constructed by Heritage Foundation, we also wish to 
explore a multivariate set of variables derived from the individual 
dimensions via factor analysis. The reason for the latter relates to the 
possible multidimensionality of the Heritage dataset. The first measure, 
‚Restrictions in Trade Policy‛, may be taken as the least controversial. 
However, when we move to the second dimension (‚fiscal burden‛), the 
consensus vanishes. In particular, while high taxation may result in 
deadweight cost, there is also evidence that economic systems where 
extreme income and wealth inequality is not corrected by redistribution 
are also associated with inefficient outcomes.3 A similar argument relates 
to the ‚Government Intervention‛ dimension, which mixes the size of 
government ownership of productive assets with the scale of government 
consumption. While most empirical evidence points to the inefficiency of 
government ownership (in particular, see Megginson and Netter, 2001), 
there is less consensus regarding the share of government consumption of 
GDP. The structure of government consumption may be more important 
than the size. 
The problem is different with the ‚Monetary Policy‛ dimension. This 
measure is based on inflation and does not include governmental 
interference in the economy, but rather the efficiency of macroeconomic 
                                                 
3 See for instance recent institutional analysis by Pryor (2006), who found that a 
combination of a relatively unrestricted business environment and equal distribution of 
assets is an institutional design strongly associated with macroeconomic growth 
performance in middle and low income countries, as exemplified primarily by South East 
Asian economies. 
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policy. These two dimensions may be correlated, but need not be. 
Similarly, with the protection of ‚Property Rights‛, the risk of 
expropriation by the government illustrates just one aspect, albeit a very 
critical one. Equally important however is the quality of law and the 
efficiency of the judicial system. This may be affected negatively as much 
by organised crime as by a dysfunctional government. As a result, the 
relevant spectrum for this indicator does not necessarily indicate the 
difference between a liberal and an interfering government, but between 
an efficient and inefficient government administration. Some of the 
developed economies (such as in Scandinavia), which are typically 
associated with large government, would also have the strongest system 
protecting their property rights. A similar argument relates to ‚Informal 
Market Activity‛, which incorporates the measure of corruption. Again, 
the critical difference illustrated by the indicator is between efficient and 
inefficient law and administrative practice and not between interfering 
and liberal government types as the Heritage Foundation asserts. 
In our opinion, while the Heritage Foundation calls its aggregate 
measure ‛Economic Freedom‛, it should rather be seen as a joint, 
composite measure of freedom from economic interference by the 
government and of efficiency of economic policies, administration and 
institutions, with a caveat that those sub-dimensions are not necessary 
collinear. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, we unbundle the ten indicators reported 
by Heritage Foundation using a principal components analysis. We utilise 
the available dataset (11 years from 1995-2005 including 164 countries and 
ten indicators) available on the Heritage Foundation’s website4. If we take 
a cut-off point of eigenvalues for factors being greater than one (Kaiser’s 
criterion), it results in data compression with just one factor ‚Property 
Rights‛ playing the dominant role. Once we apply a restrictive criterion 
(Jolliffee’s criterion: eigenvalues higher than 0.7), we produce four factors. 
The four factors extracted from the second exercise are reproduced in 
Table 1 below. 
                                                 
4 As accessed in September 2006. 
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Table 1 -  Heritage Foundation Indicators. Pattern Matrix 
. Component 
  1 2 3 4 
Property Rights 0.937     
Regulation 0.868     
Informal Markets 0.812     
Foreign Investment Regulation 0.768    
Trade Policy 0.699    
Banking and Finance 0.624    
Wages and Prices 0.537  -0.408  
Fiscal Sector  0.989   
Government Intervention   -0.914  
Monetary Policy    0.927 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. Only absolute values above 0.4 are reported. 
 
The pivotal role of the property rights dimension is a striking result. 
Clearly, property rights are in the centre of nexus of connections with 
most of other institutional features. We are also able to confirm that both 
‘Fiscal Burden’ and ‘Monetary Policy’ dimensions are disconnected from 
other institutional factors and should be best considered separately. In 
other words, strong property rights do not seem to be associated with 
either any particular tax regime, or with any particular inflation levels. 
The third factor is mostly driven by ‚Government Intervention‛ (which 
mix government consumption share with the scale of government 
ownership) and to lesser extent by labour market regulation. In this case, 
the economic size of the government and the scope of labour regulations 
seem to be associated. 
3.5 Legal Origin 
Heritage Foundation measures are closely correlated with another time-
invariant institutional measure, which plays a key role in the recent 
empirical economic studies on institutions. This related to the issue of 
legal origin, originally classified by La Porta et al. (1999) into five broad 
categories: English, French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist 
(Communist). According to La Porta et al. (1999), the legal origin can be 
viewed as a proxy for the government’s proclivity to intervene in the 
economy and the stance of the law toward security of property rights in a 
country. In light of our discussion above, it is not surprising that the 
English origin dimension, here seen as a benchmark, correlates closely 
with the summary average ‚Economic Freedom‛ indicator. This is also 
consistent with Djankov et al. (2002), who demonstrate that countries of 
French, German and Socialist legal origin have more entry regulations 
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than English legal origin countries, while countries of Scandinavian legal 
origin have about the same. We use the legal origin categories as defined 
by La Porta et al. (1999) as independent variables in our analysis. 
3.6 Control Variables: Characteristics of Entrepreneurs and 
Economic Development 
Most research indicates that men have a higher probability of becoming 
entrepreneurs than women (Minniti et al., 2005a; Verheul et al., 2006). The 
relationship between entrepreneurship and age is typically found as 
nonlinear and hump-shaped, with a peak point for starting a business 
appearing relatively early (Levesque and Minniti, 2006). In addition, the 
impact of human capital is an important area of research in terms of its 
relationship to entrepreneurship. Delmar and Davidsson (2000) and 
Davidsson and Honig (2003) show a clear education effect for nascent 
entrepreneurs. Parker (2006) suggests that on average, entrepreneurs tend 
to be more educated than non- entrepreneurs. Wennekers et al. (2005) 
have also found a significant relationship between entrepreneurship role 
models and their effect on entrepreneurship start-ups. In their cross 
country study of nascent entrepreneurship rates in 36 countries, they 
found a significant and positive relationship between the number of 
incumbent business owners and entrepreneurial start-ups. 
Research has also explored the relationship between previous 
employment and entrepreneurship. Storey (1994) found evidence 
indicating a negative relationship between being unemployed before 
starting a business and the likelihood of actual start-up5. 
Perceptual factors may also be important. Role models may play a part, 
including providing information, which alleviates both uncertainty and 
the cost of starting the business (Minniti, 2005). In this context, contacts 
with other business owners may be important at the time of the decision to 
start-up. Finally, due to informational asymmetries that are particularly 
severe for new start-ups, financing and capital constraints have been 
identified as a major issue for potential entrepreneurs. Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) show that, due to capital constraints, there is a positive 
relationship between the probability of becoming self-employed and the 
assets of the entrepreneur. Similarly, Evans and Leighton (1989) show that 
the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities is more common when 
people have greater financial capital. We capture some aspects of the 
individual specific financial constraints by using a dummy variable, which 
indicates if a potential entrepreneur was providing funds for business 
financing in the past. 
                                                 
5 A literature review regarding the relationship between business start-up and being 
unemployed is discussed in Chapter 3 of Storey (1994, p. 71 – 74).  
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A number of studies have indicated the relationship between economic 
development and entrepreneurship development (Wennekers et al., 2005; 
Carree et al., 2002; Acs et al., 1994). We control for economic development 
by including a measure of per capita GDP (purchasing power parity). 
Definitions of all the variables and descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Explanatory Variables 
Variables Definition Mean SD 
Number of 
Obs. 
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES    
her_econfree 
Index of economic freedom (Heritage Foundation);  
a higher score  represents worse institutions 
2.42 0.53 104,112 
ti_cpi 
Corruption perceptions index (Transparency 
International); higher score represents less 
corruption (i.e. better institutions) 
6.43 1.97 104,112 
pro_strong 
1 = Heritage Foundation ‘Property Rights’ index has 
a value of one (strongest), zero otherwise 
0.41 0.49 104,112 
credit_pri 
ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP (source: 
WB WDI) 
82.74 47.13 104,112 
inf_stdev 
Standard deviation in inflation over last 5 years 
(computed using WB WDI) 
2.82 5.62 104,112 
gov_cons Ratio of government consumption to GDP (WB WDI) 17.66 4.04 104,112 
tax_rate 
Highest marginal tax rate imposed on individual 
incomes (WB WDI) 
40.22 9.71 104,112 
LEGAL ORIGIN VARIABLES    
English* 1 = English legal origin, zero otherwise. 0.29 0.45 104,112 
French* 1 = French legal origin, zero otherwise. 0.25 0.43 104,112 
German* 1 = German legal origin, zero otherwise 0.11 0.31 104,112 
Scandin* 1 = Scandinavian legal origin, zero otherwise 0.07 0.25 104,112 
Socialist* 1 = Socialist legal origin**, zero otherwise.  0.29 0.45 104,112 
CONTROL VARIABLES: PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS    
dgender 1 = male, zero otherwise. 0.48 0.50 104,112 
dumownmge 
1 = current owner/manager of business, zero 
otherwise. 
0.10 0.30 104,112 
dumbusang 
1 = business angel in past three years, zero 
otherwise. 
0.02 0.15 103,546 
dumknowent 
1 = personally knows entrepreneur(s) in past two 
years, zero otherwise. 
0.33 0.47 97,443 
dumgemwork 
1 = respondent is either in full time or part time 
employment, zero otherwise. 
0.51 0.50 98,685 
ed_postsec_high 
1 = respondent has a post-secondary or higher 
educational attainment, zero otherwise.  
0.38 0.48 98,906 
ed_high 1 = respondent has a higher educational attainment  0.14 0.35 98,906 
age 
The exact age of the respondent at time of 
interview 
42.83 16.35 100,110 
age2 Age squared   100,110 
Table continues on next page 
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Table 2- Continued 
Variables Definition Mean SD 
Number of 
Obs. 
CONTROL VARIABLES: MEASURING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT    
gdp_pc_ppp 
Measured as GDP per capita, purchasing power 
parity,  constant at 2000 $ USD***. 2005 figures are 
estimates based on 2005 real GDP growth rates ♦ 
and 2005 population figures♠.  
20,209 7892,0 104,112 
gdppc_ecfree 
An interactive term for gdp per capita and the Index 
of Economic Freedom 
   
ti_gdp 
An interactive term for gdp per capita and the 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
   
* These dummy variables represent the legal origin concept based on La Porta et al. (1999). 
** In our sample this overlaps with the EBRD definition of transition economies. See EBRD Transition Reports (1995-2006) 
for further information. 
*** Source:World Bank:World Development Indicators, 2006 edition  
♦ Source: IMF Financial Statistics series; ♠ Source: CIA World Factbook (https://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/) 
3.7 Dependent Variables: Measuring Types of Entrepreneurship 
In addition to identifying new firm entry in terms of nascent 
entrepreneurs (9% of the sample), the GEM study has identified two main 
reasons motivating individuals to start a firm. They are either motivated 
by a perceived business opportunity (opportunity entrepreneurs) or 
pushed into entrepreneurship because all other options for work are either 
absent or unsatisfactory (Minniti et al., 2005b).6 According to the results of 
the GEM (Minniti , 2005; Acs et al., 2004), the vast majority of early-stage 
entrepreneurs across the world claim that they are attempting to take 
advantage of a business opportunity. However some important variations 
are worth noting. The GEM study indicates that individuals living in 
countries with a diversified labour market and comprehensive 
unemployment care are more likely to be driven by opportunity vs. 
necessity motives than in countries where these institutions are weaker. 
Not surprisingly, the ratio of opportunity to necessity based motives for 
starting a business is more favourable in high-income countries rather 
than in middle or low income countries. Correspondingly, countries with 
relatively low income and low levels of social security such as China, 
Brazil or South Africa, tend to exhibit higher levels of necessity 
entrepreneurs. Since countries that primarily exhibit opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship show a lower share of early-stage business failures, it 
seems to indicate that people starting necessity-driven businesses tend to 
do so due to lack of viable alternatives and under conditions that are not 
                                                 
6 Some authors have challenged the static distinction between opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs especially in certain socio-economic contexts (such as transition countries) 
since entrepreneurship by definition represents a dynamic process in which individuals 
may change their motivation from necessity to opportunity and vice versa due to changes 
in personal as well as environmental circumstances (for further discussion see also Aidis 
et al., 2007). 
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very favourable for business success (Minniti et al., 2005b). This latter 
observation leads us to notice that perceived opportunities are also related 
to the extent of barriers in institutional environment. Where potential 
entrepreneurs perceive that they may not be able to realise all the benefits 
from the newly created business, they may decide against starting them. 
This should relate far more strongly to opportunity entrepreneurship than 
to necessity entrepreneurship. 
3.8 Specifications and Estimation Technique 
In our analysis, we use the following models. Each of them takes the 
same set of individual level variables, as given above. Model 1 
corresponds to the binary choice between start-up and no entrepreneurial 
activity. No institutional variables are included, and instead we use a full 
set of dummies representing each country-year sample. In model 2, the 
country-year dummies are replaced by the country level variables, where 
the index of economic freedom is taken as an aggregate proxy for the 
institutional heterogeneity. In model 3 the index of economic freedom is 
replaced by the legal origin dummies, which are strongly correlated with 
the former (with the following ordering: ‚English‛ = most free, next 
‚German‛, ‚Scandinavian‛ and ‚French‛ close to each other, and finally 
‚Socialist‛). In model 4, the corruption perception index is used as a proxy 
for institutional heterogeneity. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3 - Determinants of Nascent Entrepreneurship (Startup). Logistic Regression. 
Model 1 
 Model 1  
dgender 0.356***(0.028)  
dumownmge 1.136***(0.035)  
dumbusang 1.114***(0.056)  
dumknowent 0.921***(0.029)  
dumgemwork 0.376***(0.037)  
ed_postsec_high 0.138***(0.034)  
ed_high -0.042       (0.056)  
age 0.027***(0.006)  
age2 -0.001***(0.000)  
country fixed effects omitted   
cons -3.096***(0.125)  
Number of observations 87929  
Wald chi2 7252.460***  
Log pseudolikelihood -20625.792  
Pseudo R2 0.162  
Notes: 
i. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
ii. Significant at: *.05, **.01, ***.001 
iii. US 2001 sample indicator is the omitted dummy  
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Table 4 - Determinants of Nascent Entrepreneurship (Startup). Logistic Regression. 
Models 2-4. 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
dgender 0.317***(0.058)  0.296***(0.061) 0.309***(0.057) 
dumownmge 1.155***(0.112)  1.140***(0.112) 1.143***(0.109) 
dumbusang 1.131***(0.071)  1.128***(0.078) 1.127***(0.068) 
dumknowent 0.915***(0.057) 0.957***(0.060) 0.890***(0.055) 
dumgemwork 0.295*     (0.144) 0.398**  (0.146) 0.408**  (0.154) 
ed_postsec_high 0.180**   (0.059) 0.131*     (0.056) 0.164**  (0.058) 
ed_high 0.552*     (0.216) 0.401†     (0.232) 0.587**  (0.209) 
age 0.014       (0.023) 0.017       (0.021) 0.006       (0.023) 
age2 -0.000       (0.000) -0.000       (0.000) -0.000      (0.000) 
gdp_pc_ppp 0.000**   (0.000) -0.000*     (0.000) -0.000*     (0.000) 
her_econfree 0.563†     (0.343)   
gdppc_ecfree -0.000***(0.000)   
socialist  -1.017***(0.173)  
german  -0.363       (0.230)  
french   -0.483*     (0.234)  
scandin  -0.491       (0.364)  
ti_cpi   -0.203     (0.177) 
ti_gdp   0.000     (0.000) 
cons -4.637***(1.176) -2.751***(0.357) -2.167     (0.679) 
Number of obs 87929 87929 87929 
Wald chi2 1388.860*** 1394.290*** 1689.270*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -21461.663 -21261.638 -21556.905  
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.136 0.124 
Notes: 
i. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
ii. Significant at: †.10, *.05, **.01, ***.001 
iii. Std. Err. adjusted for 40 clusters in country_year 
 
 
Next, in models 5 and 6 we split the dependent into ‘opportunity’ and 
‘necessity’ start-ups. For each of these cross-sections we use the same 
explanatory set of variables, as in models 2 and 3 (i.e., with alternative 
measures of institutions). These results are reported in Table 5 below.  
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Table 5 - Determinants of Nascent Entrepreneurship (su_opp_nec). Multinominal 
Logistic regression. Models 5-6. 
 Model5 Model6 
OPPORTUNITY   
dgender 0.284***(0.070) 0.278***(0.069) 
dumownmge 1.700***(0.147) 1.692***(0.145) 
dumbusang 0.735***(0.083) 0.736***(0.081) 
dumknowent 1.022***(0.083) 1.011***(0.081) 
dumgemwork 0.302*     (0.134) 0.380***(0.119) 
ed_postsec_high 0.339***(0.070) 0.325***(0.070) 
ed_high 0.239       (0.225) 0.273       (0.217) 
age 0.016       (0.023) 0.010       (0.023) 
age2 -0.000       (0.000) -0.000       (0.000) 
gdp_pc_ppp 0.000       (0.000) -0.000       (0.000) 
her_econfree 0.221       (0.272)  
gdppc_ecfree -0.000†     (0.000)  
ti_cpi  -0.157       (0.142) 
ti_gdp 0.000       (0.000)  
cons -4.870***(0.994) -3.661***(0.601) 
NECESSITY   
dgender 0.193*     (0.093) 0.179*     (0.087) 
dumownmge 1.981***(0.233) 1.973***(0.226) 
dumbusang 0.632***(0.132) 0.641***(0.126) 
dumknowent 0.543***(0.093) 0.519***(0.087) 
dumgemwork -0.279†     (0.170) -0.164       (0.153) 
ed_postsec_high -0.165       (0.141) -0.201       (0.132) 
ed_high 0.246       (0.406) 0.307       (0.370) 
age 0.099***(0.024) 0.091***(0.024) 
age2 -0.002***(0.000) -0.001***(0.000) 
gdp_pc_ppp 0.000       (0.000) -0.000*     (0.000) 
her_econfree 0.215       (0.282)  
gdppc_ecfree -0.000***(0.000)  
ti_cpi  -0.314†     (0.175) 
ti_gdp 0.000       (0.000)  
cons -5.502***(10.10) -4.114       (0.828) 
Number of obs. 85972 85972 
Wald chi2 3247.90*** 4146.80*** 
Log pseudo likelihood -15996.141 -16014.112 
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.144 
Notes: 
i. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
ii. Significant at: †.10, *.05, **.01, ***.001 
iii. Std. Err. adjusted for 39 clusters in country_year 
iv. ”no start-up” is the baseline outcome 
v. For Model 5: test that coefficients for her_econfree and gdppc_ecfree are the same for necessity 
and opportunity entrepreneurship: chi2(2) = 6.31* 
vi. For Model 6: test that coefficients for ti_cpi and ti_gdp are the same for necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurship: chi2(2) = 2.40 
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In our second set of models we move from single aggregate indices of 
institutional heterogeneity to multiple indicators, as discussed above. 
Model 7-9 report three different specifications based on combinations of 
individual indices (Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6 - Determinants of Nascent Entrepreneurship (Startup). Logistic Regression. 
Models 7-9. 
 Model7 Model8 Model9 
dgender 0.302***(0.058) 0.304***(0.059) 0.303***(0.060) 
dumownmge 1.145***(0.116) 1.143***(0.118) 1.146***(0.117) 
dumbusang 1.143***(0.076) 1.139***(0.075) 1.143***(0.075) 
dumknowent 0.922***(0.066) 0.923***(0.065) 0.922***(0.066) 
dumgemwork 0.356*     (0.140) 0.351*     (0.139) 0.355*     (0.142) 
ed_postsec_high 0.192***(0.055) 0.197***(0.061) 0.192***(0.056) 
ed_high 0.436       (0.296) 0.424       (0.275) 0.436       (0.295) 
age 0.014       (0.022) 0.013       (0.022) 0.014       (0.022) 
age2 -0.000       (0.000) -0.000       (0.000) -0.000       (0.000) 
pro_strong 0.465*     (0.231) 0.417†     (0.239) 0.462*     (0.230) 
credit_pri 0.005†     (0.003) 0.005*     (0.002) 0.005†     (0.003) 
inf_stdev -0.006       (0.029)   
gov_cons  -0.015       (0.022)  
gdp_pc_ppp -0.000***(0.000) -0.000**   (0.000) -0.000***(0.000) 
cons -3.182***(0.414) -2.990***(0.540) -3.203***(0.408) 
Number of obs 87929 87929 87929 
Wald chi2 1287.68*** 1203.75*** 1196.84*** 
Log pseudo likelihood -21400.061 -21391.285 -21400.314 
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.131 0.131 
Notes: 
i. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
ii. Significant at: †.10, *.05, **.01, ***.001 
iii. Std. Err. adjusted for 40 clusters in country_year 
 
 
Finally, in model 10, we return to interactions between GDP per capita 
and institutions and run a specification where the interaction relates to our 
proxy of the size of the financial sector (Table 7). 
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Table 7 - Determinants of Nascent Entrepreneurship (Startup). Logistic Regression. 
Model 10. 
 Model 10  
dgender 0.314***(0.055)  
dumownmge 1.152***(0.114)  
dumbusang 1.137***(0.074)  
dumknowent 0.921***(0.064)  
dumgemwork          0.305*     (0.134)  
ed_postsec_high 0.193***(0.055)  
ed_high 0.464†     (0.272)  
age 0.016       (0.022)  
age2 -0.000       (0.000)  
pro_strong 0.472*     (0.215)  
credit_pri -0.000       (0.006)  
gdp_pc_ppp -0.000***(0.000)  
gdppc_cre 0.000       (0.000)  
cons -2.854***(0.527)  
Number of obs 87929  
Wald chi2(13) 1224.38***  
Log pseudo likelihood -21363.825  
Pseudo R2 0.132  
Notes: 
i. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
ii. Significant at: †.10, *.05, **.01, ***.001 
iii. Std. Err. adjusted for 40 clusters in country_year 
iv. Test that coefficients for credit_pri and gdppc_cre are both zero: chi2 = 20.14*** 
 
We use logit and multiple logit as our estimators. Reported standard 
errors are robust (Sandwich) standard errors. We allow for the possibility 
that the observations are not independent for each country-year sample in 
our dataset and this is reflected in the estimated variance-covariance 
matrix and reported coefficients (apart from the specification where we 
apply the full set of sample country-year dummies instead). 
4 Discussion of Results 
Generally, the results are consistent with our priors. We discuss the 
details below. 
4.1 Results for Country Level Aggregate Institutional Variables 
Starting with legal origin dummies (model 3), we find that 
entrepreneurship is strongest in English origin countries, followed by 
German, French and Scandinavian origin (between which there are no 
significant differences) and finally weakest in the Socialist legal origin 
countries, confirming our hypothesis 3. 
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Replacing the legal origin dummies with closely correlated index of 
economic freedom (which as we argued above should rather be seen as a 
composite index of economic freedom and institutional quality) we 
confirm our hypothesis 1: better institutions affect entrepreneurship 
positively (model 2). However, we obtain one additional interesting result: 
‚Economic Freedom‛ has stronger impact on entrepreneurship in middle 
income and rich countries, but less so in poor countries. This is consistent 
with Klapper et al. (2006) findings for newly incorporated firms. High 
income countries are characterised by more complex technological and 
economic structures of production, where interdependence between the 
economic agents matters even more than in poor countries. This could 
explain the increasing significance of the quality of institutions in rich 
countries. The interactive term between the GDP per capita and 
institutional quality is strongly significant (and more significant than the 
individual terms). It is difficult to work out this joint impact of the three 
variables (GDP per capita, an institutional indicator and an interactive 
term), just from looking at coefficients,  but based on both models 2 and 3 
we calculated that at mean level of other variables, improved level of 
institutional quality results in more entrepreneurship. Interestingly, the 
effect becomes even stronger for developed countries. For poor countries, 
the institutions seem to matter less for entrepreneurship. We illustrate 
these effects with Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 - Impact of Economic Freedom on Entrepreneurship 
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Corruption proves to be a more problematic indicator, mainly because 
it is strongly correlated with GDP per capita (correlation between the two 
variables is 0.85; which may be compared to a slightly lower correlation 
coefficient of corruption with the index of economic freedom: - 0.76). 
Therefore – as we control for GDP per capita - significant effects are more 
difficult to estimate. As a mean effect we find nevertheless that lower 
corruption is associated with more entrepreneurship. For the corruption 
index, in the case of less developed countries, the corresponding impact of 
institutions becomes marginally negative. One should not read too much 
from this, however. Joint impact of GDP per capita and institutions is only 
marginally significant (p-value=0.0966), while it is much more robust for 
the economic freedom measure (p-value=0.0037).Thus, the latter should be 
trusted more in this context (results available on request). 
An interesting novel result is that institutional quality (‚Economic 
Freedom‛) affects ‘opportunity’ entrepreneurship more than ‘necessity’ 
entrepreneurship. This provides support for the hypothesis 4. Again, joint 
effects are not easy to calculate from coefficients reported in Table 5, but 
we illustrate them with Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 - Impact of Economic Freedom on Necessity versus Opportunity Start-ups 
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institutional environment may decide against entry, unlike in case of 
‘necessity’ entrepreneurship. 
Our key institutional results based on aggregate institutional indicators 
may be summarized as follow. Institutional quality (‚Economic Freedom‛, 
a measure closely correlated with the concept of English legal origin) is 
clearly associated with more entrepreneurship, and the effect is strongest 
in developed countries. This is consistent with popular perceptions and 
consistent with Djankov et al. (2002), who found that the English legal 
origin is strongly associated with lowest barriers to entry. 
Entrepreneurship seems to play an important role in development. In 
this narrow sense therefore, we could conclude that the English legal 
origin setting is ‘superior’. However, there are clearly other institutional 
aspects that affect economic performance in different way. Japan, 
Germany, France, Scandinavian countries and others represent different 
legal traditions which were equally successful in the long-term process of 
the economic development. Clearly, in this wider perspective, their 
deficiency with respect to entrepreneurship must be counter-balanced by 
some other institutional advantages, which is an issue going beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
4.2 Multiple Institutional Indicators 
Two institutional indicators emerge as robust from various 
specifications based on the combinations of five institutional indices 
discussed above. These are: strong protection of property rights and the 
size of the private sector financing (models 7-10). This result provides 
support for hypothesis 2. Both come with positive sign, and clearly affect 
the scope of entrepreneurship significantly. Next, inflation and the 
economic size of the government come with expected (negative) signs but 
are insignificant in multivariate specifications, and their effects remain 
dominated by the first two dimensions. Finally, marginal tax rates remain 
consistently insignificant (and come with unexpected positive signs).  
Given the significance of the scope of finance, we also explore the 
results of interaction of this variable with the level of GDP per capita. 
Interestingly, the pattern of impact of finance on entrepreneurship 
remains similar for different level of development. This is in contrast to 
the economic freedom indicator, which has far stronger impact for rich 
countries. We illustrate the effects of this interaction with Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3 - Impact of Credit/GDP on Entrepreneurship 
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entrepreneurship development, especially opportunity entrepreneurship. 
Of specific importance is the protection of property rights and a strong 
financial sector. But it is also important to note that though laws can 
change quickly, the more fundamental and lasting change to the 
institutional environment takes time as is exemplified by the generally 
slower rate of entrepreneurship development in the post-Socialist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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